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1. Introduction  
Virtually all European borders areas are involved in some type of cross-border 
region (CBR). Today, there are more than seventy such arrangements in Europe, 
usually operating under names such as ‘Euroregions’ or ‘Working Communities’. 
Although CBRs have a long tradition in post-war Western Europe (O’Dowd, 
2003), the 1990s saw a large increase all over Europe.  
Among the various models, ‘Euroregions’ have certainly received most recent 
attention in policy practice, mostly because they fit the organisational and spatial 
requirements of the EU support programme for CBRs. As opposed to the larger, 
multi-regional Working Communities that often spread over several countries, 
Euroregions are small-scale groupings of contiguous public authorities across one 
or more nation-state borders and can be referred to as ‘micro-CBRs’ (Perkmann, 
2003).  
Are Euroregions a new type of region, spanning national borders and creating 
cross-border territories? As such, they would insert themselves into the wider 
tendencies of ‘rescaling’ and ‘reterritorialisation’ theorised by various observers 
(Blatter, 2001; Jessop, 2002; Brenner, 1999). At the same time however, others 
have emphasised the patchy track record of European CBRs, both in terms of 
institution-building as well as their actual impact on local cross-border 
environments (Beck 1997; Church and Reid 1999; Liberda 1996; Scott 1998; 
Sidaway 2001). Even the European Commission – the main sponsor of many of 
these collaboration initiatives – accepts that it has generally been difficult to 
induce genuine cross-border collaborative projects (O’Dowd, 2003). Against this 
background, the apparently even proliferation of Euroregions across the EU 
warrants some further investigation.  
This paper pursues two objectives. Firstly, it aims to establish that there is great 
variation across different cases of Euroregions particularly in relation to the 
degree to which they have established themselves as independent organisational 
actors. Secondly, it explores the institutional conditions across different countries 
that facilitate such an organisational emancipation of Euroregions.   
For the first objective, I use the concept of policy entrepreneurship as an 
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analytical lens for capturing variation. The concept provides a tool to assess to 
what degree Euroregions represent actual actors able to shape their environment. 
It thereby makes it possible to discriminate between Euroregions which have 
achieved a certain capacity to act and those which are mere ceremonial envelopes 
or administration vehicles for EU programmes.  
The analysis is set against the background of the EU multi-level governance 
system that provides opportunities for new types of policy actors to appropriate 
policy competencies and resources in an entrepreneurial fashion. It assumes that 
for CBRs to have an impact as independently constituted actors, they require an 
organisational basis, complemented by the capability to mobilise a resource 
stream to fuel the enactment of cross-border strategies and related interventions.  
Although some contributions have addressed differences between Europe and 
North America (Blatter, 2001; Brunet-Jailly, 2004), a systematic comparison of 
Euroregions has been largely missing from the literature. A comparative case 
study approach can be seen as complementary to quantitative work on the 
proliferation and forms of European CBRs (Perkmann 2003).  
To address the second objective, the paper explores the factors behind the uneven 
development of local cross-border relationships across the European Union. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the political-administrative context in which 
Euroregions developed and propositions are developed as to what context 
conditions are conducive to successful cross-border regions.  
The paper is organised as follows: First, I provide an overview on the specificities 
of European CBRs. Second, I introduce a framework that conceptualises cross-
border regions within wider developments in the European polity and builds on 
the ideas of policy entrepreneurship and resource mobilization. The third section 
discusses the methods used and provides brief overviews on the single cases: the 
EUREGIO, the Viadrina and the Tyrol. The case study evidence is then compared 
across the cases by using operational criteria provided by the policy 
entrepreneurship framework. The conclusion synthesises the results and identifies 
the facilitating factors behind successful cases of CBC.  
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2. Cross-border regions, the European experience  
2.1 Characteristics of European cross-border regions  
European CBRs represent policy-driven rather than market-driven cases of local 
cross-border integration. This distinction can be made against the background of 
the main drivers of cross-border integration processes. In this respect, two main 
integration scenarios can be distinguished:  
(a) Market-driven integration: based on the proliferation and/or reactivation of 
social or economic relationships. Such processes of cross-borderisation can 
often be found to predominate in case of persisting borders where highly 
accentuated cross-border differentials stimulate strong cross-border activity, 
for instance in terms of factor costs such as labour. Examples are provided by 
'Greater China' (Sum, 2002) or the US-Mexican border (Scott, 1999); in each 
of these cases, market-driven integration processes were induced by the 
declaration of Special Economic Zones.  
(b) Policy-driven integration: based on the building of co-operative relationships 
between public and other bodies that share certain interests, such as coping 
with environmental interdependencies or creating cross-border economic 
spaces. These networks often emerge in response to the failures of central 
state authorities, with local and regional actors exploiting the new opportunity 
structures created by regionalisation and globalisation. Examples are provided 
by most European CBRs but also ‘compensatory’ meso-level networks that 
emerge as a reaction to the interdependencies or negative externalities created 
by market-driven cross-border integration, such as on the US-Mexican border 
(Scott, 1999).  
European CBRs can be largely characterized as policy-driven focused on the 
building of meso-level cross-border policy institutions. This applies in particular 
to micro-CBRs – or Euroregions in common parlance – which are institutionally 
the most developed type of CBR in Europe.  
In practice, such CBRs are defined by three characteristics (Perkmann, 2003). 
First, they belong to the realm of public agency, with their protagonists being 
contiguous sub-national public authorities on local, district or regional levels from 
 5
two or more countries. Many CBRs emerged as a result of the stabilisation of 
cross-border contacts over time, involving a de-facto institutionalisation of 
governance structures, decision-making mechanisms and distribution rules. 
Secondly, CBRs are often based on informal or ‘quasi-juridical’ arrangements 
among the participating authorities. This is because subnational authorities are 
usually not allowed to agree international treaties with foreign authorities. Third, 
in substantive terms, CBRs are foremost concerned with practical problem-
solving in a broad range of fields of everyday administrative life; these tend to be 
local policy areas with a perceived need for policy co-ordination or the 
management of cross-border interdependencies. In this respect, nearly all CBRs 
are concerned with implementing measures funding by the EU programme 
Interreg (cf. below) which include such diverse fields as SME support, technology 
and innovation, education and culture, labour market, spatial planning and the 
environment.  
Organisationally, many Euroregions have a council, a presidency, subject-matter 
oriented working groups and a secretariat. Thus, the term ‘CBR’ refers to both a 
territorial unit, made up of the aggregate territories of participating authorities, 
and an organisational entity, usually the secretariat or management unit. In most 
cases, the participating bodies are local authorities, although sometimes regional 
or district authorities are involved. Occasionally, other organisations, such as 
regional development agencies, interest associations and chambers of commerce 
also participate in the governance of the CBR. The spatial extension of micro-
CBRs will usually range between 50 and 100km in width; and they tend to be 
inhabited by a few million inhabitants.  
2.2 European CBC: history and supranational policy context 
The first formal CBR, the EUREGIO, was established in 1958 on the Dutch-
German border, shortly followed by a number of initiatives along the Rhine basin, 
notably the Regio Basiliensis around Basel (Speiser 1993). Today municipalities, 
districts and regional authorities in more than seventy locales co-operate with 
their counterparts via a variety of organisational arrangements.  
Crucially, this process was facilitated by supranational institutions, such as the 
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Council of Europe1 and the European Union. Resultant partly from strategies of 
transnational collective representation pursued by border authorities, they helped 
create the conditions under which border authorities could collaborate in a 
situation characterised by legal uncertainty and ‘soft’ institutions. The classical 
form of the Euroregion is the ‘twin association’: on each side of the border, 
municipalities and districts form an association according to a legal form suitable 
within their own national legal system. In a second step, the associations then join 
each other on the basis of a cross-border agreement – traditionally according to 
private law – to establish the CBR.  
In 1980, an international treaty, known as Madrid Convention was agreed to 
provide a first step towards CBR structures based on public law. Many 
Euroregions however do not (yet) make use of this legal-institutional opportunity, 
preferring to collaborate on the basis of alternative agreements. The Madrid 
Convention therefore failed to live up to the hopes of the proponents of CBRs 
which were to provide a strong alternative to centrally controlled ‘border 
commissions’ for governing trans-border interdependencies.  
By contrast, a supranational policy of great impact was created when the 
European Commission launched the Interreg I programme, designed to financially 
support CBRs, in 1990. This was followed by Interreg II (1994-99) and Interreg 
III (2000-06); the latter was allocated a budget of € 4.875b (1999 prices), 
corresponding to approximately 2.3% of the total regional policy budget of the 
EU.  
Local and regional authorities and other organisations located on external2 and 
internal land borders, as well as some maritime areas, are eligible to apply for 
Interreg support to pursue cross-border projects. As the European Commission’s 
objective is to develop cross-border social and economic centres through common 
development strategies, eligible projects are required to demonstrate a structural 
economic benefit to the border area. The allocation of funds is governed by 
                                                 
1 The Council of Europe (CoE) is a intergovernmental organisation headquartered 
in Strassbourg founded in 1949.  
2 Borders with non-EU members.  
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Steering Committees controlled by higher-level authorities (central governments 
and/or regional authorities) as they are responsible for the lawful implementation 
of policies towards the European Commission.  
3. Euroregions and policy entrepreneurship  
Interreg is by far the most important source of funding for most micro-CBRs, 
raising the question whether these initiatives exist only because this type of 
resource is available. In that case, they would qualify as hardly more than ‘grant 
coalitions’ (Cochrane, Peck and Tickell 1996) that disintegrate once the funding 
stream runs out. The evidence suggests this may be the case for some, but 
certainly not all CBRs in Europe. On the other hand, observers have pointed out 
that a certain degree of ‘entrepreneurial’ behaviour can actually indicate an 
effective empowerment of the regions against their central-state authorities within 
the context of EU integration (Smyrl 1997); in this sense, their ability to mobilise 
funding could be interpreted as success.  
In this section, I suggest a way of going beyond the binary choice between 
‘instrumental’ and ‘genuine’ collaboration by offering a framework that can 
discriminate between different cases. This builds on ideas derived from the new 
institutionalism in political and organisational analysis (March and Olsen 1984) 
that conceive policy developments in the context of institutional constraints and 
opportunities. Specifically, the concept of policy entrepreneurship is used to 
understand the emergence of policy organisations in contexts of relative openness 
that characterise the operation of European cross-border regions.   
3.1 Euroregions, multi-level governance and state re-structuring  
Empirically speaking, the distinction between instrumental and genuine co-
operation motives is difficult to operationalise. It appears more appropriate to 
focus on outcomes rather than on the more intangible imputed motives for 
establishing CBRs. Among various possible outcome criteria, this paper makes a 
conscious choice to focus on organisation-building as a main indicator and 
outcome of successful co-operation. Euroregions are evaluated as to whether they 
succeeded in establishing themselves as functioning organisations with some 
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degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the participating member authorities on both sides 
of the border. This criterion allows us to distinguish between co-operation 
arrangements based on relatively independent organisations and ‘committee co-
operation’ in which decision-making is limited to distributing EU funds as 
opposed to producing specific and enduring cross-border effects (Beck, 1997).  
It should be noted that the focus on organisation-building is one step removed 
from assessing whether they are effective in furthering economic or social cross-
border integration. This choice is based on the assumption that functioning cross-
border organisations are more likely than ad-hoc committees to induce cross-
border integration as this becomes their organisational mission and basis of 
survival. The choice is also reinforced by the lack of comparative data on local 
cross-border integration.  
More importantly, an organisational view of Euroregions resonates with a number 
of themes in the broader literature on European integration and the trends 
affecting the nation state. On the first theme, the recent literature sheds light on 
the multi-level governance structures emerging particularly within EU regional 
policy (Hooghe, 1996; Benz and Eberlein, 1999). This literature is primarily 
concerned with the impact of Cohesion Policy on territorial organisation in the 
EU Member States, with an explicit focus on the involvement of regional 
authorities in decision-making at various stages of the policy process.  
Given the interdependence of national and sub-national actors, the European 
polity can be seen as an interconnected system of non-nested political arenas in 
which the boundaries between domestic and international politics are increasingly 
blurred (Marks, 1996). Although the formal sovereignty of the Member States is 
retained, it is claimed that the unilateral control of states over their territories de 
facto continues to erode (Conzelmann 1998: 5).  
Within this scenario, Hooghe and Marks (2003) argue that a new type of territory 
has come to complement the traditional type of non-intersecting and nested 
territory. Such ‘type II governance’ involves task-specific jurisdictions, 
intersecting membership and flexibly designed competencies and intervention 
mechanisms (ibid.). It is easy to see why Euroregions can be seen in this way as 
an example for such type II structures. They focus on cross-border policy co-
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ordination as their specialist task, they involve members drawn from various 
different jurisdictions and are flexibly designed to respond to their policy 
mandate. It follows that organisation-building will be an essential part of the 
emergence of such type II governance structures.  
The focus on organisation-building is reinforced by the specific characteristics of 
the European policy space. The EU is an atypical policy maker in that it has no 
implementation agency. It relies on the member states and their subordinate 
authorities to execute policy. Despite its weak formal powers, however, the EU 
has a remarkable impact because the procedural requirements laid out in the 
regulations give the Commission a considerable say over the substantive content 
of policies. The Cohesion Policy regulations provide various incentives for 
agency co-operation and co-ordination and hence the creation of policy networks 
(Heinelt and Smith, 1996). For instance, in many programmes the Commission 
requires subnational actors to be involved in policy implementation. The 
‘partnership principle’ functions as an effective intervention instrument that 
allows the Commission to exert influence at all stages of the policy process, i.e. 
initiation, policy design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation (Tömmel, 
1994). The requirement of unanimity ensures that decision-making in the 
implementation networks relies on consensus-driven bargaining which provides a 
favourable context for effectiveness-oriented administrative action (Heinelt 1996: 
298) as opposed to ‘horse-trading’ over (re)distributive issues. It is in this 
networked, multi-level policy space, that policy opportunities arise for specialist, 
type II governance actors who support the European Commission in implementing 
policies.  
This trend towards type II governance can be read against the context of broader 
tendencies affecting statehood as outlined by Jessop (2004). On one hand, the 
‘denationalisation’ of statehood involves the shifting of state powers upwards to 
supranational bodies and down to regional or local states, or even networks of 
regional or local states. On the other, the retreat of the state implies a shift from 
‘government to governance’ towards self-organising networks of public agency. 
This ‘weakening of territorial “power containers” […] relative to non-territorial 
forms of political power that are formally independent of state borders’ (ibid.) 
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refers precisely to the formation of type II governance units. Jessop (2002) details 
some implications of these processes for the rescaling of territories. In any case it 
can be assumed that such tendencies indicate the requirement that non-central 
state agencies build organisational capacity to pursue public and semi-public 
governance functions. The next section develops a more detailed framework for 
analysing such organisation-building processes.  
3.2 A framework for comparing Euroregions  
The preceding arguments describe a context that provides an opportunity space 
for actors capable of assuming policy tasks and attracting resources to execute 
them. This will almost certainly involve the creation and development of 
relatively durable and autonomous organisations. In this section, I suggest that the 
concept of policy entrepreneurship can be used to capture this process. Two 
bodies of literature are used: work on policy entrepreneurship, and work on 
resource mobilisation within the context of organisations and social movements.  
Within the literature on policy innovation (Mintrom, 1997), policy entrepreneurs 
are characterised as actors who position themselves as protagonists within specific 
policy areas by taking advantage of windows of opportunity opened up by 
conjunctures within their policy environment. Reflecting the ‘garbage can model’ 
of organisational choice (Cohen et al 1972), they are in constant search for 
possible problems for which they can offer a solution (Kingdon 1984; Majone and 
Tame 1996; Mintrom and Vergari 1996). They do this not necessarily for 
financial profit but to increase the influence of their organisation or organisational 
unit which is often correlated to their resource basis.   
Recent research on EU policy formation has applied the concept of policy 
entrepreneurship to the European Commission (Laffan, 1997; Moravcsik, 1999). 
The Commission is described as a policy agent capable of entrepreneurially 
exploiting the resources at its disposal in order to generate new policies that are 
acceptable to various coalitions of member states.  
By way of analogy the concept can be applied, with some modifications, to 
Euroregions. Brouard (1996), for instance, analyses the construction of the 
Atlantic Arc – a Working Community at the Western fringes of the European 
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Union from the UK to Portugal – as a ‘political enterprise’. Although not using 
the notion of policy entrepreneurship, Carmin et al. (2003) show that the 
emergence of the White Carpathian Euroregion was shaped by environmentally 
oriented NGOs seizing an opportunity structure which in turn had been created by 
changes within their national political systems and the availability of European 
Union support.  
For current purposes, I propose to amend these notions of political 
entrepreneurship in two respects. Firstly, while the notion is often applied to 
theorise individual agency, i.e. the strategies of entrepreneurial individuals 
(Kingdon, 1984), I apply the notion to activities and strategies of Euroregions as 
organisations. In recent work, political scientists have suggested that it is not 
always possible to trace policy innovation back to individuals but that it needs to 
be attributed to collectives (Roberts and King, 1996).  
Secondly, and following from the last point, strategies to exploit windows of 
opportunities will be accompanied by a process of organisation-building. As with 
any other organisation, once a Euroregion is established as such, it will operate to 
secure organisational survival (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). This will occur within 
the constraints and opportunities afforded by the organisation’s ability to mobilise 
resource and the specialist competencies it will be able to build up over time. 
Though mostly applied to social movements, resource mobilisation theory can 
hence be used to inform an operational framework to assess the success of 
Euroregions. In particular, it refers to the ability of these organisations to create 
and maintain a support base on a local level; in most cases, this will involve 
maintaining networks of local authorities as paying members.  
In light of the above considerations, why would Euroregions qualify as policy 
entrepreneurs? First, unlike most public-sector organisations, Euroregions do not 
exist on the basis of constitutional or public-law enactments. Their organisational 
set-up and operating procedures are policy innovations that were developed over 
time within a context of legal uncertainty and novelty. Second, their resource base 
is not guaranteed by statutory income streams but is secured only in the short-term 
and often derived from multiple resources. Third, their areas of responsibility are 
not defined a priori but were developed over time during a complex search 
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process guided by the overall theme, or organisational mission, of CBRs.  
It can be argued that under these fluid circumstances successful Euroregions can 
develop only through active policy entrepreneurship, capable of exploiting 
windows of opportunity, and resulting in a growing organisational base. For 
empirical analysis, the concept can be operationalized according to the following 
criteria:  
1. Organisational development: To acquire a relative degree of strategic and 
operational autonomy vis-à-vis ‘ordinary’ border authorities, successful 
Euroregions need to develop as independent organisations with a clear 
specialisation in CBR matters.  
2. Diversification of resource base: Euroregions that depend on Interreg 
funding risk being reduced to mere implementation agencies for this 
specific type of EU regional policy. Successful Euroregions can be 
expected to have more diversified and stable income streams, for instance 
via membership fees from participating authorities or the appropriation of 
other policy activities relevant for the border space. However, assuming 
that the availability of EU funding provides selective incentives (Olson, 
1965) for municipalities to shoulder the cost of participation in return for 
Interreg project funding – which could be indicative for purely 
‘instrumental’ participation – it can be postulated that successful 
Euroregions will attempt to broaden their resource base to encompass 
other, more diversified sources. 
3. Appropriation of Cross-border co-operation (CBC) activities: Successful 
Euroregions establish themselves as important players within the overall 
context of cross-border strategies in a given border area. Such strategies 
may be pursued by other public or semi-public authorities, commercial 
entities or civil society organisations. Successful CBR organisations can 
be expected to appropriate or influence such CBC strategising in their area 
and seek to be recognised as legitimate and competent by other players.  
In the following section, these criteria are applied to the case studies to capture 
the variance of CBR initiatives.  
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4. Comments on methods and cases  
A comparative case study approach is used to substantiate the claims advanced 
above (Eisenhardt, 1989). For each case, qualitative evidence was collected, 
providing the depth of analysis to allow a detailed understanding of the logic of 
each case. At the same time, the comparative dimension enabled a schematic 
differentiation of the features that were at the centre of the present investigation.  
Theoretical sampling was applied for selecting the cases. This means cases were 
selected on the basis of expected differences that would allow the highlighting of 
theoretical issues. The cases include the EUREGIO, a Dutch-German CBR and 
one of the oldest in Europe; the ‘Pro Europa Viadrina’ (forthwith: Viadrina), a 
German-Polish CBR that until recently reached across the external border of the 
EU; the ‘Europaregion Tyrol’ (forthwith: Tyrol Euroregion) between Austria and 
Italy.  
Building on the author’s knowledge of European CBRs from previous research, 
these cases were selected because they promised to vary considerably in relation 
to the construct of policy entrepreneurship. The cases also differ with respect to:  
(a) Type of participating authorities: local authorities (EUREGIO, Viadrina), 
regional authorities (Tyrol);  
(b) Territorial organisation of involved countries: federalist and high 
municipal autonomy (EUREGIO), federalist/centralist and low municipal 
autonomy (Tyrol), with an intermediate position for the Viadrina.  
There are two source types for the evidence: semi-structured interviews and 
policy documentation. A total of 35 interviews were held between 1997 and 2000 
with individuals involved in the EUREGIO, Viadrina and Tyrol Euroregions. The 
questions covered the history of cross-border collaboration, organisational 
structures and processes, network relationships with both local and supra-local 
authorities. Informants were also asked about interest configurations, visions and 
strategies, achievements and challenges experienced within the Euroregions. 
Interviewees were conducted with officials in the cross-border organisations and 
civil servants at member municipalities, municipal associations, districts, 
provinces and states working with the cross-border organisations in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Austria and Italy. In addition, eight interviews 
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were conducted with individuals at the European Commission and other Brussels-
based bodies.  
Interviews lasted 1.5 hours on average and were taped and transcribed. References 
to interviews are coded according to the format ‘iE1’, ‘iV2’, etc; a list is provided 
in the annex. The capital letters in the code indicate the cases (‘E’ for EUREGIO, 
‘V’ for Viadrina, ‘T’ for Tyrol, ‘B’ for Brussels). Interviews evidence was 
complemented with documentary materials: policy and communication materials 
produced by Euroregions, member authorities, the European Commission and 
other organisations. Before discussing the evidence in relation to the framework 
developed above, the cases are briefly described.   
 
Table 1 about here  
 
4.1 The EUREGIO 
The EUREGIO is one of four Dutch-German CBRs. It has a population of approx. 
3m, consisting of Dutch and German citizens on a balanced basis and approx. 140 
municipal members; the largest urban centres are Enschede (NL) and Münster and 
Osnabrück on the German side.   
The EUREGIO dates back to 1958 when municipal associations on both sides of 
the Dutch-German border decided to engage in collective action to alleviate the 
relative marginalisation of the local border economies. In 1966, a ‘Work Group’ 
was founded to operate as the informal board of the cross-border region. At the 
same time, a secretariat funded via membership fees was established. At the time, 
this was distributed across two locations, one on each side of the border. In the 
mid-seventies, the Work Group was given a formal statute, and an action 
programme was developed. This formalisation process ended with the 
establishment of the Council in 1978, the first cross-border regional parliamentary 
assembly in Europe, consisting of the political delegates of the member 
authorities.  
The EUREGIO pioneered the idea of regional cross-border development 
strategies, for instance through the ‘regional cross-border action programme’, 
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presented in 1987, which outlined the general strategy for a twenty year period. 
This action programme constituted the main input for a first Operational 
Programme under EU Cohesion Policy for the period 1989-1992, funded as a pilot 
project. When the European Commission launched Interreg I in 1990, the 
EUREGIO reacted with the speedy elaboration of a second Operational 
Programme and has since been instrumental in deploying Interreg policy 
measures in this area.  
4.2 The Viadrina  
The ‘Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina’ is one of eight Euroregions which span the 
borders between Germany and Poland and/or the Czech Republic. It covers the 
eastern part of the East German State (Land) Brandenburg around the city of 
Frankfurt/Oder and parts of the Lubuskie and Zachodnio-Pomorskie voivodships 
(districts) in western Poland and has a population of approx. 1m.  
This cross-border body involves local authorities as well as functional and 
representational bodies, such as the Chamber of Industry and Commerce and the 
World Trade Centre Frankfurt (Oder). Similar to the EUREGIO, its bodies 
include the Council, the Presidency, a secretariat and sector-specific working 
groups.  
The foundation of the Viadrina in 1993 followed the breakdown of the Socialist 
bloc and German re-unification. Socio-economically, its environment is 
characterised by strong border differences between the East German and Polish 
economies generated by radical structural and institutional changes on the 
German side in the 1990s. Until very recently – i.e. Poland’s EU accession – the 
Viadrina cut through the external EU-border as the German parts were EU 
territory while the Polish areas were not. Hence only German border areas were 
eligible for EU Interreg support while the Polish part depended on centrally 
administered funding from the Polish government.  
There were two key motives for establishing the Euroregion. The initial desire to 
establish neighbourly relationships originated in civil society circles on the 
German side. A foundation, the ‘Frankfurt Bridge’ was established whose 
objective was to contribute to German-Polish ‘reconciliation’ after the re-opening 
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of the border. Almost simultaneously the local authorities, particularly on the 
German side, were made aware of the prospective availability of EU Interreg 
funding for CBC. This was also a strong driver for a local co-operation initiative. 
The process was supported by the Land Brandenburg which under German 
legislation is responsible for the implementation of EU regional policy 
programmes and hence had a strong interest in establishing administrative 
structures suitable for deploying Interreg funding in its border areas. Ultimately, 
this meant that the organisational form to be chosen for establishing a CBR was 
going to be a ‘Euroregion’ – adopting the successful model of the EUREGIO and 
other mature CBRs – and not a foundation as originally proposed by the civil 
society actors.  
4.3 The Euroregion Tyrol  
The Tyrol Euroregion has a population of approx. 1.5m and involves the 
provinces of Trentino and South Tyrol (Italy) and the Land Tirol (Austria) with 
Trento, Bolzano and Innsbruck as the main centres. Here, the motivation for 
creating the Euroregion3 differs entirely from the other two cases. It is an example 
of a CBR embedded in an ethnic minority context (Luverà 1996). The German-
speaking southern part of the previous Tyrol County was ceded to Italy after 
World War I while the Northern part remained with the newly constituted 
Austrian Republic. It is no surprise that the building of a CBR in this case invoked 
the common cultural and ethnic heritage of the German-speaking populations in 
both countries as a common overarching territorial identity, a component largely 
missing from the other cases.  
Politically, the post-war history of South Tyrol is characterised by the struggle for 
‘self-determination’ pursued by the main German-speaking forces. This struggle 
was successful insofar as an ‘autonomous’ constitutional status was obtained in 
1991 after decade-long negotiations with the Italian central government. 
Although cross-border co-ordination and collaboration had been pursued for most 
of the post-war period, the establishment of a Euroregion as a formal platform was 
                                                 
3 Officially: ‘European Region of Tyrol – South Tyrol – Trentino’.  
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initiated only in the 1990s. As opposed to the EUREGIO and Viadrina, the Tyrol 
Euroregion does not involve any municipalities or other lower-tier authorities. 
While in the two former cases the establishment of CBRs resulted from a process 
of bottom-up regional mobilisation involving a large number of authorities, the 
Tyrol Euroregion is based on an agreement between a small number of 
established regional authorities.  
5. Discussion: Comparing Euroregions  
So far I have pursued the argument that the concept of policy entrepreneurship 
provides a suitable tool for understanding the nature of Euroregions and capturing 
their variation. In this section, the framework is confronted with the available case 
evidence. It should be noted that through the isomorphic influence of the Interreg 
programme, the substantial range of cross-border policies across the different 
cases is similar. Reflecting a trend affecting EU Cohesion Policy as a whole, 
activities such as technology and innovation support for commercial firms, 
universities and research organisations have become more important in financial 
volume at the expense of the more traditional cross-border policies in the 
transport, social and cultural fields (iE13). This can be verified by comparing the 
final reports of Interreg I and II and the intermediate reports for Interreg III 
published by each initiative. The cases differ however in relation to the extent to 
which activities are locally controlled by dedicated Euroregion organisations. This 
is the subject of the comparison in the remainder of this section.  
5.1 Organisation development  
The first element of policy entrepreneurship refers to the degree to which 
Euroregions have established an organisational basis. Apart from the mere 
organisational size, this concerns, on one hand the relative autonomy they have 
achieved within the local and vertical networks of public authorities concerned 
with cross-border policies and on the other, whether or not they have widened 
their range of activities by taking on related tasks and competencies within their 
context.  
Among the three cases, the EUREGIO secretariat developed the most advanced 
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organisational capability with approx. thirty employees.  Although it acted on 
behalf of more than 140 local authorities, the EUREGIO was not a public 
authority, at least not as a cross-border unit. This means, inter alia, that the 
secretariat had no formal competencies nor any guaranteed income streams. Thus 
the range of tasks assumed by the EUREGIO, and in particular its secretariat, was 
relatively undefined. This enabled the secretariat to act in an entrepreneurial 
fashion as long as it had the backing of the member authorities and this relative 
discretion in defining and expanding its tasks was widely used.  
Informants from involved local and central-state authorities acknowledged that 
the secretariat exerted considerable informal influence on EU programme 
implementation based on its expertise and local connectedness. On one hand, it 
acted as a project animator, it ensured that all available funds were allocated and 
turning initial ideas into project applications ready for submission to the Steering 
Committee (iE6). A senior NRW official observed: ‘… you can’t pull projects 
like a rabbit out of a hat’, implying that the higher-level authorities relied on the 
EUREGIO in this respect (iE11). On the other hand, it made itself indispensable 
as a network broker. For genuine cross-border projects, project applicants needed 
partners on the other side of the border and these relevant contacts were usually 
established by the secretariat (iE7).  
The EUREGIO also managed secretariats for related associations, such as the 
Interreg Steering and Monitoring Committees, a Dutch-German cultural 
commission, a socio-economic advisory council, a forum of Belgian-Dutch-
German Euroregions and the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR).  
The development of the Viadrina as an organisation, by contrast, was more 
limited. Although the Viadrina’s headquarters was formally in Poland, the 
secretariat had separate German and Polish sections of which the larger was in 
Frankfurt/Oder with approx. eight staff. In terms of its role, the secretariat’s 
activities were essentially confined to administering the deployment of Interreg 
funds. Compared to the EUREGIO, the Viadrina secretariat had less impact on 
decision-making relating to the funding of cross-border projects. This was partly 
to do with the fact that for most of its history Interreg funding was only available 
to the German side.  
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EU support from another programme (Phare) was available for the Polish Areas 
but the administrative separation proved a barrier to effective cross-border 
projects and decision-making mechanisms were complex and unwieldy (Grix and 
Knowles, 2003). Consequently, most projects were merely border projects rather 
than cross-border activities. The Brandenburg Land administration therefore had 
the opportunity to operate more hierarchically with regard to of the Euroregion’s 
overall direction, effectively limiting its strategic and operational autonomy: 
‘…the Land [Brandenburg] has a massive say in the selection of projects although 
its financial contribution is only marginal’ (iV5). According to a senior Land 
official, the Land was generous in offering the Euroregion a seat on the Steering 
Committee but this meant that ‘effectively we created ourselves an unnecessary 
problem as relationships are difficult…’ (iV6).  
Such statements are in stark contrast to the EUREGIO where substantial project 
decisions were made within the EUREGIO organisation and then procedurally 
approved by the Interreg Steering Committee. A senior civil servant in the Land 
administration remarked: ‘We [the Land] do nothing that is not backed in the 
EUREGIO bodies; we even do things that do not fit our own priorities. But 
because it concerns cross-border co-operation we decide to do them’ (iE4, 
similarly E11). This is reinforced by a Dutch government ministry official who 
stated that  ‘the central state has less control over the implementation of Interreg 
because of its cross-border character and the strong status of the EUREGIO’ 
(iE3).  
In the Tyrol case a different situation prevailed. In an early attempt in the 1990s, 
the three participating regional authorities sought to institute the Euroregion as a 
formal authority recognised by public law in both countries (Toniatti 1997: 32). 
However, facing local and national opposition fuelled by nationalist, legal and 
sovereignty-related concerns, the project was abandoned and replaced by a 
collaboration agreement that remained short of establishing a common secretariat.  
In this situation, the Euroregion remained a largely symbolic envelope rather than 
an operational organisation with a coherent strategy. The small secretariat 
established in the Italian city of Bolzano in the early 2000s acted mainly as a 
public relations outlet rather than an active driver of cross-border activities. The 
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Euroregion Tyrol also lacked the representational and decision-making bodies 
seen in the other cases. Decisions on cross-border projects were taken at yearly 
conferences that brought together representatives from the three member 
authorities, strongly influenced by their executive branches (iT6).  
Of the cases considered, the EUREGIO has the most developed organisational 
capacity This is reflected in its number of employees and the discretion in cross-
border matters it is awarded by higher-level authorities. The opposite scenario is 
represented by the Tyrol Euroregion where organisational capacity is only 
embryonically developed and decisions are therefore made by committees while 
the Viadrina occupies an intermediate position.  
5.2 Diversification of resource base  
The second criterion refers to the degree to which Euregional organisations have 
diversified their resource base away from exclusive reliance on Interreg.  
The EUREGIO’s standing was reflected in its ability to generate a stable resource 
flow to maintain its operations. It had considerable income from sources not 
related to Interreg, notably from a membership fee charged to the member 
authorities, EUR .29 per inhabitant at the time of writing.4 The secretariat proved 
rather successful in raising project-related funding long before Interreg was 
launched. In most cases, local funds were complemented by contributions from 
NRW and the European Commission. For instance, a cultural commission 
(‘Mozer Commission’) was funded separately from various regional and national 
sources in both countries. More recently, the secretariat bid successfully for pilot-
projects from the European Commission. Among others, the EUREGIO managed 
a ‘EURES-T’ unit concerned with labour market issues, a consumer advice centre 
and a ‘Euro-Info-Center’ for SMEs. As a result, the secretariat operated a range of 
activities that strengthen its profile as cross-border regional advice and citizen’s 
service centre.  
The Viadrina also charged a membership fee to member authorities but its 
resource stream was more narrowly dependent on proceeds from Interreg 
                                                 
4 www.euregio.de, accessed 12/04/2006.  
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‘technical assistance’. These are the funds allocated to local agencies to cover the 
costs of the administration of Interreg, as opposed to those available to project 
applicants for cross-border projects which constitute the majority of EU funding. 
The EUREGIO managed to obtain a larger share of those latter funds available 
compared to the Viadrina by being a project applicant and owner itself. This 
further increased the EUREGIO’s resource position and promoted its 
organisation-building efforts.  
Given the low profile of the Tyrol Euroregion as an organisation, the question of 
resource base diversification does not apply. It is significant, however, that this 
Euroregion is not involved in the implementation of Interreg and is hence not 
funded by Interreg technical assistance. One reason for this is that the area 
designated for Interreg support by the European Commission does not exactly 
correspond to the territories of the co-operating regional authorities. In addition, 
the participating authorities do not depend on Interreg for running a Euroregion 
as, compared to the municipalities in the EUREGIO and Viadrina cases, these are 
regional authorities for whom the material contribution of Interreg funding is 
small.  
Among the three cases, the EUREGIO secretariat has gone furthest in diversifying 
its resource base although Interreg still constitutes by far the largest share of 
income. Even at this level, however, the EUREGIO’s efforts differentiate it from 
the Viadrina which relies almost exclusively on Interreg technical assistance. Due 
to its embryonic status, the criterion is not applicable at all to the Tyrol 
Euroregion.  
5.3 Appropriation of cross-border activities 
The final criterion suggested by the policy entrepreneurship framework refers to 
the degree to which Euroregional organisations appropriate cross-border policy 
activities within their area. This section therefore assesses the extent to which 
Euroregions were involved as protagonists or at least participants in other policy 
activities aimed at promoting cross-border integration in their areas.  
The EUREGIO appeared to have established itself as a highly regarded regional 
development agency in the Dutch-German border area: ‘In our [geographic] area, 
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cross-border co-operation is automatically associated with the EUREGIO’ (iE6). 
Beyond being an implementation unit acting on behalf of the European 
Commission and the involved member states, the EUREGIO had become the 
undisputed reference point for all ‘cross-border issues’ in the local environment 
and was recognised as such by the local authorities on both sides of the border: 
‘[The EUREGIO] has become a natural part of the day-to-day administrative life’ 
(iE9, similar iE12).  
This status as regional development agency for a cross-border space was reflected 
in the ambitions of its functionaries. The objective was the transformation of the 
cross-border area into a ‘central location in North-West Europe’ (Gabbe, 1985: 
95). Policy frameworks inspired by the idea of a homogenous region have existed 
since the early stages of the EUREGIO. The vision of a ‘functional unit in all 
spheres of life’ between the Dutch Randstad and the German Ruhr originated in 
the late sixties, if not earlier (CoE, 1972: 111). The development of such visions 
can be seen as important in constituting a strategic envelope for the organisation-
building strategies of the EUREGIO.  
The EUREGIO’s appropriation of Interreg implementation before the programme 
was launched illustrates its entrepreneurial capability to exploit policy 
opportunities. In the 1980s, member municipalities agreed to increase their 
financial contribution in the expectation that this would help secure a substantial 
local impact on the allocation of future European funding (iE5). The EUREGIO 
hence grasped a strategic opportunity when it was still undecided whether a large-
scale CBC support programme would be launched by the European Commission. 
The result was that when Interreg was finally launched, with fifteen staff members 
the EUREGIO secretariat was the natural candidate for the management of the 
programme in its area: ‘… the EUREGIO was already there, it was obvious that 
they were going to do the programme management.’ (iE1).  
In comparison, the Viadrina’s remit was limited to administering Interreg funds 
and it failed to be a relevant player in a number of other policy initiatives targeted 
at the German-Polish border space. Various commentators have noted that the 
Euroregion failed to deliver on the inflated expectations it nurtured in the initial 
period (Grix and Knowles, 2003; Scott, 1998).  
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For instance, the Euroregion was not involved in talks between the operators of 
‘Technology Park’, a high-tech industrial estate operator in Frankfurt (Oder), and 
the Special Economic Zone set up by the Polish government in Kostrzyn-Słubice 
(iV11, iV13) in the late 1990s. The operators were considering jointly developing 
‘cross-border packages’ for investors. The Euroregion was also absent from 
drawing up plans for cross-border industrial estates, i.e. bi-national areas with a 
special territorial status (Scott 1998).  
This comparatively low profile of the Viadrina in the cross-border policy 
landscape was reflected in the reluctance of upper-tier authorities to grant the 
Euroregion further powers. According to a Brandenburg ministry official, the 
Euroregion ‘has failed to bundle the interests and competencies of the member 
authorities into a coherent development concept, which has it made completely 
dependent on funds from Brussels’  (iV6). Individuals closer to the Euroregion 
countered that ‘the Land has no trust in the Euroregion, and tends to extract 
Interreg funds for measures that bear little relation to border issues’ (iV3). Despite 
differences in interpretation, one can conclude that the Viadrina does not enjoy a 
status comparable to the EUREGIO’s position as cross-border agency within its 
geographic remit.  
Finally, the Tyrol Euroregion played only a marginal role in the complex cross-
border policy landscape in the Central Alps. Historically, co-operation has long 
been pursued among the authorities involved. The relationships in the cultural-
educational field were particularly well developed – for instance concerning 
university education. Equally, in the health field, complementarities between the 
hospitals in South Tyrol and the University clinic in Innsbruck have been 
exploited in the past. Largely informal co-ordination also occurred on large 
transport infrastructures, a sensitive issue in the ecologically fragile Alpine area, 
and other aspects of the environment (iT1). In the wider context of the Eastern 
Alps, the three regional authorities have also been engaged in the Working 
Communities Arge Alp and the Alpe-Adria.  
For the initiation of these activities preceded the Euroregion, it had no legitimate 
prerogative to take over the co-ordination of cross-border measures when it was 
established. Notably, the administration of Interreg was not transferred to the 
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Euroregion (as an organisation) but continued to be carried out in conjunction 
with other EU programmes by the responsible administrative units of the 
participating authorities. This is despite the fact that many of these projects were 
criticised even by the policy implementers themselves as they had little genuine 
cross-border content (iT6). Some Interreg projects were devolved to 
deconcentrated branches of the regional administrations located in the immediate 
border areas. These units were historically involved in other EU-funded 
programmes, such as LEADER, and hence had the required expertise (iT5).  
It can be concluded that the impact of the Euroregion as an organisation on the 
CBC landscape in Tyrol is small. The Euroregion Tyrol is a largely symbolical 
project promoted by the political leaders of the three regions whereas the practical 
aspects appear marginal. This Euroregion, therefore, is qualitatively different 
from the EUREGIO that was constituted through a bottom-up process of regional 
mobilisation with strongly pragmatic features.   
6. Conclusions 
The use of the concept of policy entrepreneurship as a framework for analysis 
uncovered considerable variation across the three Euroregions in relation to their 
organisational set-up and the degree to which they have established themselves as 
organisations and actors in their own right. The EUREGIO illustrates the ‘model’ 
European CBR. It emerged as a result of the successful bottom-up mobilisation of 
municipalities on the Dutch-German border, led by an entrepreneurial secretariat, 
and has inserted itself as a legitimate cross-border development agency in its local 
context across the Dutch-German border.  
By contrast, the Viadrina is a latecomer and – in an act of mimetic isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) – adopted a readily available organisational model. 
For the German local and Land authorities, the purpose of the Euroregion was to 
have a vehicle to deploy EU Interreg funds in the border area. The effective 
regional mobilisation - establishing collective action capacity among local actors 
– was less pronounced than in the EUREGIO, and higher-level authorities, such 
as the central state and regional authorities, retained stronger control.  
The Euroregion Tyrol is an example for a CBR created by a politically driven 
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ethno-regional project that has largely failed to develop autonomous 
organisational capacity. It differs from the EUREGIO and the Viadrina in that it 
does not involve municipal actors but rather is pursued largely on the basis of a 
top-level agreement among already established regional authorities. It has 
remained a confederal envelope as opposed to operating independently as a cross-
border agency.  
The analysis allows for some careful generalisation on the structural conditions of 
successful Euroregional policy entrepreneurship, particularly if one considers that 
Euroregions in similar administrative environments operate in similar ways. The 
cases suggest that the ability of Euroregions to engage in active policy 
entrepreneurship is shaped by the politico-administrative environments in which 
they operate. Two cases were located in Northern Europe whereas one case 
(Tyrol) is Central-European and involves a Southern European country, Italy. 
Synthesising the evidence, it appears that the ability of municipalities to engage in 
collective action – both intra-nationally and then cross-nationally – is important in 
constituting a strategic opportunity space for Euroregions. In this respect, there 
are major differences between Northern Europe (Germany, Netherlands, 
Scandinavia) and countries such as Italy and France. As Page and Goldsmith 
(1997) argue, Northern European local governments have higher margins of 
discretion and a broader set of responsibilities supported up by locally raised 
resources than those in Southern Europe.  
This discussion suggests CBRs are more likely to be effective in countries with a 
strong tradition of municipal autonomy. In the German system, the two-level 
structure of local authorities – consisting of the municipalities on one hand and 
district-type aggregations of municipalities (Kreise) on the other – facilitates 
collective action among municipalities. The (West) German Länder have 
historically developed a benevolent attitude towards inter-municipal co-operation 
in general and to CBRs in particular, as this was seen as a way to decentralise the 
implementation of local regional policies (Voelzkow, 1995).  
In this context, the autonomy gained by the Euroregions has allowed them to 
engage in policy entrepreneurship, exploit windows of opportunities related to the 
cross-border theme and build organisational competence in cross-border policies 
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– as seen in the case of the EUREGIO. Their ability to assert themselves as small, 
specialised Interreg implementation units – with major implications for their 
resource base – is one of the foremost examples of this.  
Although both are involved in Interreg, differences remain between the 
EUREGIO, which emerged as a grass roots movement long before Interreg funds 
were available, and the Viadrina where the availability of Interreg was a major 
rationale for adopting the form of a Euroregion for creating a CBR. The 
EUREGIO’s more diversified resource base, organisational capacity and 
legitimacy within the local environment are in stark contrast to the Viadrina 
whose role is mostly limited to administering Interreg and which has failed to 
assert itself as a strategic actor in cross-border matters.  
The results confirm the broader analyses of ‘multi-level governance’ policy 
structures which argue that European regional policies are implemented within 
complex vertical integration networks exhibiting strong variation across member 
states. This article has added a micro-perspective on the modalities of agency and 
strategy formation at the grass roots level; it postulates that policy 
entrepreneurship and organisation-building are among the main mechanisms for 
generating durable local action in the multi-level governance framework.  
If one agrees that these are desirable characteristics of policy implementation, one 
can use the conceptual components of policy entrepreneurship to generate a set of 
success criteria for cross-border regions or similar initiatives. Equally, the 
framework can inform some of the variables for further, quantitatively oriented 
research evaluating success or failure of a larger number of Euroregions.  
On the broader question as to whether we are witnessing the emergence of a new 
type of regional territory (cross-border regions), the answer is two-fold: Firstly, 
the degree to which genuine cross-border agency is established across local cross-
border spaces varies strongly, dependent primarily on the territorial-
administrative context and specific local conditions for the emergence of such 
policy entrepreneurship. This comparative case study analysis has shown that in 
some cases Euroregions represent hardly more than paper tigers while in others 
one can see the embryonic emergence of cross-border regional governance 
structures linked to a cross-border agency.  
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Secondly, even in those cases where cross-border agency has been successfully 
institutionalised, it appears premature to attribute the characteristics of a ‘region’ 
to these entities. Although they assume pseudo-territorial features, and engage in 
strategies of cross-border identity building invoking territorial imaginaries, their 
relative dimensions in terms of organisational size and resource control are still 
small compared to the established public authorities on either side of the border 
(Perkmann, 2007). Rather, they constitute an institutional form through which 
existing authorities engage in collective action across nation-state borders. We 
need to regard Euroregions as part of the dynamic policy innovation scenario 
induced by EU integration rather than as new territorial entities strictly speaking.   
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Annex: Interview codes  
iB1  European Commission, DG16, INTERREG II/c (spatial planning), Brussels 
(BE) 
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iB2  European Commission, DG16, INTERREG II, Brussels  
iB3 European Commission, DG12, Brussels  
iB4  European Commission, DG16, Internal inter-regional co-operation, Brussels 
iB5  European Commission, DG16, innovative actions, Brussels 
iB6 LACE-TAP office, Brussels  
iB7 European Commission, DG1, Brussels 
iB8 European Commission, DG16, Brussels 
iE1 Overijssel Province, Zwolle (NL)  
iE2  Landkreis Grafschaft Bentheim, Nordhorn (DE)  
iE3  Ministry of Economic Affairs (Dutch government), Regio Oost, Arnhem 
(NL) 
iE4  Bezirkregierung Weser-Ems, Oldenburg (DE) 
iE5 EUREGIO, Gronau (DE) (group interview).  
iE6  Bezirkregierung, Abteilung Regionalplanung und Wirtschaft, Münster (DE)  
iE7  Beleidsmedewerker Economische Zaken en Grensoverschrijdende 
Samenwerking, Regio Acherhoek (NL) 
iE8  EUREGIO, Gronau (DE) 
iE9  Landkreis Steinfurt, Steinfurt (DE)  
iE10 NRW.Bank, Düsseldorf (DE)  
iE11 Ministry of Economics, SMEs, Technology and Transport, Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Düsseldorf (DE)  
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iE12 Kreis Borken, Stabstelle, Bocholt (DE) 
iE13 EUREGIO secretariat (DE)  
iT1 Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige, Bolzano (IT) 
iT2 University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck (AT) 
iT3 Consiglio Provinciale, Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige, Bolzano 
(IT) 
iT4 Department for European affairs, Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto 
Adige, Bolzano (IT)  
iT5 LEADER co-ordination unit, Schluderns (IT) 
iT6 Department for European affairs, Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto 
Adige, Bolzano (IT) 
iT7 Regione Autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Udine (IT) 
iT8 Interreg unit, Land Tirol, Innsbruck (AT) 
iV1 IRS/Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning, Erkner (DE) 
iV2 European Universiy Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder (DE) 
iV3 European Universiy Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder (DE) 
iV4 Institute of Urban Development and Dwelling (ISW), Frankfurt/Oder (DE) 
iV5 Euroregion secretariat, Frankfurt/Oder (DE) 
iV6 Ministry of Justice and Federal and European Affairs, Land Brandenburg, 
Potsdam (DE) 
iV7 Viadrina University, Frankfurt/Oder (DE) 
iV8 Regionale Planungsgemeinschaft Oderland-Spree, Beeskow (DE) 
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iV9 City of Frankfurt/Oder (DE) 
iV10 Gemeinsame Landesplanungsabteilung Berlin/Brandenburg, Frankfurt/Oder 
(DE) 
iV11 Investors’ Center, Technology Park, Frankfurt/Oder (DE) 
iV 12 Ministry of Economics, SMEs and Technology, Land Brandenburg, 
Potsdam (DE) 
iV13 Euroregion secretariat (DE) 
iV14 City of Gorzów (PL)  
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Tables and figures 
Table 1: General characteristics of the cases  
 EUREGIO (DE/NL) Viadrina (DE/PL) Tyrol Euroregion 
(AT/IT)  
Specific border 
regime  
Open border 
scenario (ex D-Mark 
block)  
Former external EU 
border (persisting  
border)  
Recently open 
(Austria’s EU 
accession) 
Historical 
background  
Post-war 
reconciliation  
Alienation in 
socialist period 
Common ethnicity  
Inter-State 
relationships 
Early bi-national 
treaty on cross-
border co-operation, 
‘CBC-friendly’, 
Neighbourhood 
agreement, 
rapprochement 
between Germany 
and Poland 
Politically sensitive 
minority issue, 1995 
treaty on cross-
border co-operation  
Dominant level 
of co-operation  
Municipalities  Municipalities, 
strong role of higher 
level authorities  
Regional authorities  
Policy problem Manage inter-
dependencies and 
promote cross-border 
functional 
integration   
Attract investment, 
stimulate economic 
growth, cultural 
relationships  
Symbolic territorial 
politics  
Strategic context 
of cross-border 
agency   
Long established 
inter-municipal co-
operation with clear 
CBR focus  
Only recent 
development of 
intermunicipal co-
operation (partly 
externally imposed) 
Weak sense of 
cross-border agency   
 
Table 2: Criteria for policy entrepreneurship  
 EUREGIO  Viadrina  Tyrol Euroregion 
CBR 
organisation   
Secretariat (high 
degree of autonomy)  
Secretariat (low degree 
of autonomy)   
Range of agencies 
associated with 
regional authorities 
(fragmented)  
Resource base Diversified Dependent on Interreg Not developed  
CBC 
appropriation 
High Low  Low 
 
 
 
